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ABSTRACT
Recent work on machine learning has begun to con-
sider issues of fairness. In this paper, we extend the
concept of fairness to recommendation. In particular,
we show that in some recommendation contexts, fair-
ness may be a multisided concept, in which fair out-
comes for multiple individuals need to be considered.
Based on these considerations, we present a taxonomy
of classes of fairness-aware recommender systems and
suggest possible fairness-aware recommendationarchi-
tectures.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Bias and fairness in machine learning are topics of con-
siderable recent research interest [4, 6, 17]. A standard
approach in this area is to identify a variable or vari-
ables representingmembership in a protected class, for
example, race in an employment context, and to de-
velop algorithms that remove bias relative to this vari-
able. See, for example, [11, 12, 23, 24].
To extend this concept to recommender systems, we
must recognize the key role of personalization. Inher-
ent in the idea of recommendation is that the best items
for one user may be dierent than those for another. It
is also important to note that recommender systems
exist to facilitate transactions. Thus, many recommen-
dation applications involve multiple stakeholders and
therefore may give rise to fairness issues for more than
one group of participants [1].
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1.1 Personalization
The dominant recommendation paradigm, collabora-
tive ltering [13], uses user behavior as its input, ignor-
ing user demographics and item attributes. However,
this does not mean that fairness is irrelevant. Consider
a recommender system suggesting job opportunities to
job seekers. An operator of such a system might wish,
for example, to ensure that male and female users with
similar qualicationsget recommendations of jobswith
similar rank and salary. The system would therefore
need to defend against biases in recommendation out-
put, even biases that might arise entirely due to be-
havioral dierences: for example, male users might be
more likely to click optimistically on high-paying jobs.
Defeating such biases is dicult if we cannot assert a
shared global preference ranking over items. Personal
preference is the essence of recommendation especially
in areas like music, books, and movies where individ-
ual taste is paramount. Even in the employment do-
main, some usersmight prefer a somewhat lower-paying
job if it had other advantages: such as exible hours,
shorter commute time, or better benets. Thus, to achieve
the policy goal of fair recommendationof jobs by salary,
a site operatorwill have to go beyond a purely personalization-
oriented approach, identify salary as the key outcome
variable, and control the recommendation algorithm
to make it sensitive to the salary distribution for pro-
tected groups.
1.2 Multiple stakeholders
As the example of job recommendation makes clear, a
recommender system is often in the position of facili-
tating a transaction between parties, such as job seeker
and prospective employer. Fairness towards both par-
ties may be important. For example, at the same time
that the system is ensuring that male and female users
to get recommendations with similar salary distribu-
tions, it might also need to ensure that jobs at minority-
owned businesses are being recommended to the most
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desirable job candidates at the same rate as jobs atwhite-
owned businesses.
Amultistakeholder recommender system is one inwhich
the end user is not the only party whose interests are
considered in generating recommendations [1, 5]. This
term acknowledges that recommender systems often
servemultiple goals and therefore a purely user-centered
approach is insucient. Bilateral considerations, such
as those in employment recommendation, were rst
studied in the category of reciprocal recommendation
where a recommendation must be acceptable to both
parties in a transaction [3]. Other reciprocal recom-
mendation domains include on-line dating [18], peer-
to-peer “sharing economy” recommendation (such as
AirBnB, Uber and others), on-line advertising [9], and
scientic collaboration [15, 20].
When recommendationsmust account for the needs
of more than just the two transacting parties, we move
beyond reciprocal recommendation tomultistakeholder
recommendation. Today’s web economy hosts a pro-
fusion of multisided platforms, systems of commerce
and exchange that bring together multiple parties in a
marketplace,where the transacting individuals and the
market itself all share in the transaction [8]. These plat-
forms must by design try to satisfy multiple stakehold-
ers. Examples include LinkedIn, which brings together
professionals, employers and recruiters; Etsy, which brings
together shoppers and small-scale artisans; andKiva.org,
which brings together charitably-minded individuals
with third-world entrepreneurs in need of capital.
1.3 Stakeholder utility
Dierent recommendation scenarios can be distinguished
by diering congurations of interests among the stake-
holders. We divide the stakeholders of a given recom-
mender system into three categories: consumersC, providers
P , and platform or system S . The consumers are those
who receive the recommendations. They are the indi-
viduals whose choice or search problems bring them to
the platform, and who expect recommendations to sat-
isfy those needs. The providers are those entities that
supply or otherwise stand behind the recommended
objects, and gain from the consumer’s choice.2 The -
nal category is the platform itself, which has created
the recommender system in order to match consumers
2In some recommendation scenarios, like on-line dating, the con-
sumers and providers are same individuals.
with providers and has some means of gaining benet
from successfully doing so.
Recommendation inmultistakeholder settings needs
to be approached dierently from user-focused envi-
ronments. In particular, we have found that formaliz-
ing and computing stakeholder utilities is a produc-
tive way to design and evaluate recommendation algo-
rithms. Ultimately, the system owner is the one whose
utility should be maximized: if there is some outcome
valued by the recommender system operator, it should
be included in the calculation of system utility.
The system inevitably has objectives that are a func-
tion of the utilities of the other stakeholders. Multi-
sided platforms thrive when they can attract and retain
criticalmasses of participants on all sides of themarket.
In our employment example, if a job seeker does not
nd the system’s recommendations valuable, he or she
may ignore this aspect of the system or may migrate to
a competing platform. The same is true of providers; a
company may choose other platforms on which to pro-
mote its job openings if a given site does not present its
ads as recommendations or does not deliver acceptable
candidates.
System utilities are highly domain-specic: tied to
particular business models and types of transactions
that they facilitate. If there is some monetary transac-
tion facilitated by the platform, the systemwill usually
get some share. The system will also have some utility
associated with customer satisfaction, and some por-
tion of that can be attributed to providing good rec-
ommendations. In domains subject to legal regulation,
such as employment and housing, there will be value
associated with compliance with anti-discrimination
statutes. There may also be a (dicult to quantify) util-
ity associatedwith an organization’s socialmission that
may also value fair outcomes. All of these factors will
govern how the platform values the dierent trade-os
associated with making recommendations.
2 MULTISIDED FAIRNESS
Recommendationprocesseswithinmultisided platforms
can give rise to questions ofmultisided fairness. Namely,
there may be fairness-related criteria at play on more
than one side of a transaction, and therefore the trans-
action cannot be evaluated simply on the basis of the
results that accrue to one side. There are three classes
of systems, distinguished by the fairness issues that
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arise relative to these groups: consumers (C-fairness),
providers (P-fairness), and both (CP-fairness).
2.1 C-fairness
A recommender system distinguished by C-fairness is
one that must take into account the disparate impact of
recommendation on protected classes of recommenda-
tion consumers. In the motivating example from [6], a
credit card company is recommending consumer credit
oers. There are no producer-side fairness issues since
the products are all coming from the same bank.
Multistakeholder considerations do not arise in sys-
tems of this type. A number of designs could be pro-
posed. One intriguing possibility is to design a recom-
mender system following the approach of [23] in gen-
erating fair classication. We could dene a mapping
from each user to a prototype space, perhaps dened
in terms of latent factors extracted from the rating data.
Each prototype could be engineered to have the prop-
erty of statistical parity relative to the protected class.
A key consideration in this type of system is to ensure
a bounded loss with respect to ranking accuracy for
users. We plan to explore this type of system design in
future work.
2.2 P-fairness
A system of requiring P-fairness is one in which fair-
ness needs to be preserved for the providers only. A
good example of this kind of system is Kiva.org, on-
line micro-nance site. Kiva aggregates loan requests
from eld partners around the world who lend small
amounts of money to entrepreneurs in their local com-
munities. The loans are funded interest-free by Kiva’s
members, largely in the United States. Kiva does not
currently oer a personalized recommendation func-
tion, but if it did, one can imagine a goal of the organi-
zation would be to preserve fair distribution of capital
across its dierent partners in the face of well-known
biases of users [14]. Consumers of the recommenda-
tions are essentially donors and do not receive any di-
rect benet from the system, so there are no fairness
considerations on the consumer side.
P-fairnessmay also be a considerationwhere there is
interest in ensuring market diversity and avoiding mo-
nopoly domination. For example, in the on-line craft
marketplace Etsy3, the system maywish to ensure that
3www.etsy.com
new entrants to the market get a reasonable share of
recommendations even though theywill have had fewer
shoppers than established vendors. This type of fair-
ness may not be mandated by law, but is rooted instead
in the platform’s business model.
There are complexities in P-fairness systems that do
not arise in the C-fairness case. In particular, the pro-
ducers in the P-fairness case are passive; they do not
seek out recommendationopportunities but rathermust
wait for users to come to the system and request recom-
mendations. Consider the employment case discussed
above.Wewould like it to be the case that jobs atminority-
owned businesses are recommended to highly-qualied
candidates at the same rate that jobs at other types
of businesses. The opportunity for a given minority-
owned business to be recommended to an appropriate
candidate may arrive only rarely and must be recog-
nized as such. As with the C-fairness case, wewill want
to bound the loss of personalization that accompanies
any promotion of protected providers.
There is considerable research in the area of diversity-
aware recommendation [2, 21]. Essentially, these sys-
tems treat recommendation as a multi-objective opti-
mization problem where the goal is to maintain a cer-
tain level of accuracy, while also ensuring that recom-
mendation lists are diverse with respect to some repre-
sentation of item content. These techniques can be re-
purposed for P-fairness recommendation by treating
the items from the protected group as a dierent class
and then optimizing for diverse recommendations rel-
ative to this variable.
Note, however, that this type of solution does not
guarantee that any given item is recommended fairly,
only that recommendation lists have the requisite level
of diversity. This distinction is known as list diversity
vs catalog coverage in the recommendation literature
and as individual vs. group fairness in fairness-aware
classication [6]. List diversity can be achieved by rec-
ommending the same “diverse” items to everyone, but
does not provide a fair outcome for the whole set of
providers.
Achieving individual P-fairness / catalog coverage
requires amore dynamicmodel of handling recommen-
dation opportunities. Perhaps the closest analogy is found
in on-line bidding for display advertising, where lim-
ited ad budgets serve the function of spreading impres-
sions among competing advertisers [22]. Consider a
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system inwhich providers have a xed budget (in arti-
cial system currency) that can be used to bid on recom-
mendation opportunities during a particular time pe-
riod. When a user requests a set of recommendations,
appropriate recommendations are calculated, but will
only be guaranteed to be delivered to the user if the
advertiser successfully bids in a second-price auction
mechanism for the opportunity [7].
Individual P-fairness within the limitations of the
personalized mechanism is achieved in this context by
giving the protected group equal purchasing power to
the non-protectedgroup. Assume that there arep providers
from the protected group and q other providers, with
p ≪ q. The purchasing parity rule requires that we al-
locate B/2p budget to each provider in the protected
class and B/2q to the other providers, where B is the
total ad budget.
Depending on the information available to each pro-
vider, the design of a bidding agent for this market
could be arbitrarily complex, but conversely, the sys-
tem couldmake bidding agents simple to design by lim-
iting the information about the recommendation op-
portunity that is available to the agents. A rational bid-
ding approach would be to bid a quantity proportional
to the agent’s remaining budget and the candidate’s
quality and inversely proportional to the number of
future bid opportunities. This design is similar to the
BALANCE algorithm that achieves fair budget draw-
down in on-line advertising [10].
2.3 CP-fairness
Finally, a multisided platform may require fairness be
considered for both consumers and suppliers: the CP-
fairness condition. This can arise in reciprocal recom-
mendation or in any domain in which both consumers
and providers may belong to protected groups: the em-
ployment scenario was discussed earlier, but there are
others that we can envision. A rental property recom-
mender may treat minority applicants as a protected
class and wish to ensure that they are recommended
properties similar to white renters. At the same time,
the recommendermaywish to treatminority landlords
as a protected class and ensure that highly-qualied
tenants are referred to themat the same rate as towhite
landlords.
The solutions described above are decoupled, in the
sense that a recommendation ranking that is C-fair can
be passed on to the bidding mechanism required to
achieve P-fairness. One important question for future
research is how the outcomes for each stakeholder and
the overall system performance are aected by combin-
ing such solutions.
3 CONCLUSION
This paper extends ideas of fairness in classication
to personalized recommendation. A key aspect of this
extension is to note the tension between a personal-
ized view of recommendation delivery and a regula-
tory view that values particular outcomes. The regu-
latory view is somewhat foreign to research in person-
alization, but there is strong argument that total obe-
dience to user preference is not always risk-free or de-
sirable [16, 19]. This paper also introduces the concept
of multisided fairness, relevant inmultisided platforms
that serve a matchmaking function. Provider-side fair-
ness, especially if dened at the individual level, re-
quires an architecture sensitive to the dynamics of the
recommendation environment.
I have outlined some possible approaches to ensur-
ing multsided fairness in recommendation. One of the
key challenges in this area is the domain-specicity of
multistakeholder environments. The utilities that are
delivered to each class of stakeholder are highly depen-
dent on the type of item being recommended, the busi-
ness model of the platform, and the interactions that it
enables. It is therefore dicult to nd appropriate data
sets for experimentation and challenging to generalize
across recommendation scenarios.
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